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Eating the Poisonous Fruit: The Eighth
Circuit Will Not Exclude Derivative
Evidence from a Miranda Violation
United States v. Villalba-Alvarado'
I. INTRODUCTION
Today almost anyone who has ever turned on a television is familiar
with the four Miranda warnings. However, the general public is probably not
aware of what happens when those rights are violated. From the time the
United States Supreme Court handed down the Miranda v. Arizona2 decision,
courts have struggled to determine what evidence should be excluded as a
result of a Miranda violation.3 When the Supreme Court stated that Miranda
v. Arizona announced a constitutional rule in Dickerson v. United States,
4
many of these struggles ended.5 However, the lower courts have split about
whether evidence derived from a Miranda violation is subject to the Wong
Sun v. United States6 fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine.7 Recently, the Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to rule on this issue, but the case yielded no
majority opinion and the circuits remain divided . In United States v.
Villalba-Alvarado,9 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Third and
Fourth Circuits in holding that the poisonous fruit doctrine does not apply to
physical evidence derived from a Miranda violation.'0
1. 345 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2003).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles 467 U.S.
649 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
4. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
5. Id. at 444.
6. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
7. See United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Patane,
304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004); United States v. Ster-
ling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir.
2001).
8. United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
9. 345 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2003).
10. Id. at 1019.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Police obtained a search warrant for Villalba-Alvarado's car, home, and
person subsequent to a controlled drug buy with pre-recorded currency.
I
When the officers executing the warrant spotted Villalba-Alvarado in his car,
they immediately handcuffed him and brought him back to his house.'
2
Villalba-Alvarado was not advised of his Miranda rights at this time.' 3 At his
house, Villalba-Alvarado voluntarily disclosed to the officers the location of a
hidden panel containing cocaine and a scale.' 4 He also disclosed that he had a
coat in the closet containing $3,360, a portion of which was the pre-recorded
currency. 5 The search of Villalba-Alvarado's home lasted another forty-five
minutes but revealed no other evidence. 16 After the search, the officers took
Villalba-Alvarado to the police station where they advised him of his rights
for the first time. 17 Villalba-Alvarado waived his Miranda rights and gave
another statement detailing where the drugs were found.' 8
'At trial, Villalba-Alvarado asserted that since Dickerson v. United
States19 declared Miranda v. Arizona 20 a constitutional rule, the police's fail-
ure to administer the Miranda warnings was a constitutional violation and the
poisonous fruits doctrine applied.2 However, the United States argued that
the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine did not apply, that the physical evi-
dence would have inevitably been discovered in the course of executing the
warrant, and that the second statement from Villalba-Alvarado dissipated the
taint of the prior unwarned statement.22 Villalba-Alvarado argued that be-
cause Dickerson23 undermined the holdings of Oregon v. Elstad 4 and Michi-
gan v. Tucker,25 both his second statement and the physical evidence should
be suppressed.26






17. Id. at 1009.
18. Id.
19. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1011-12.
22. Id. at 1009.
23. 530 U.S. at 438-39 (holding that Miranda is a constitutional rather than
merely prophylactic rule).
24. 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (admitting evidence of a voluntary, warned confes-
sion after an earlier Miranda violation).
25. 417 U.S. 433, 450-52 (1974) (admitting testimony of a witness identified by
an unwarned statement).
26. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1009-12.
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Following a suppression hearing, the magistrate recommended: 1) the
drugs be suppressed under the Wong Sun v. United States27 poisonous fruits
doctrine, 2) the money be admitted under the inevitable discovery rule, and 3)
the post-Mirandized statements also be suppressed under the poisonous fruits
doctrine.28 The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota con-
curred with most of the magistrate's recommendations, but amended them to
admit part of the second statement that did not relate to the physical evi-
dence.
29
A three judge panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed. 30 The appellate court relied on the language in
Dickerson reaffmning a difference between an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment and an unwarned statement under the Fifth Amendment
to conclude that the Supreme Court had reaffirmed Elstad.31 This meant that
the post-waiver statement in the instant case did not need to be suppressed
under the poisonous fruits doctrine.32 The Eighth Circuit analyzed similar
cases from the First, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits and decided to join the
Third and Fourth Circuits' holdings that there need not be a distinction be-
tween types of derivative evidence.33 Rather any type of evidence derived
from a Miranda violation is subject to a voluntariness standard.34 Finally, the
court concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine could not apply to the
35drugs, but it could apply to the currency.
27. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
28. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1009.
29. Id. at 1009-10.
30. Id. at 1008.
31. Id. at 1012. Elstad held a voluntary, warned confession admissible even
though it followed an initial unwarned statement. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309
(1985). Elstad was given a full set of Miranda warnings after the initial statement and
before the second confession. Id. at 301. The Eighth Circuit in the instant case be-
lieves that a full set of Miranda warnings will also dissipate the taint of physical evi-
dence derived from the initial unwamed statement. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at
1013.
32. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1013. The court also cited United States v.
Feller, a post-Dickerson case in which the court found a post-warning, post-waiver
statement following an earlier Miranda violation admissible because the latter state-
ment was voluntary. Id. (citing United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir.
2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 519 (2004)). Relying on the distinction in Dickerson between
the application of the exclusionary rule to Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations and
its earlier holding in Fellers, the court found the post-waiver statement to be admissi-
ble. Id. This portion of the holding will not be discussed further in this Note.
33. Id. at 1019.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1020. Nix v. Williams laid out a two part test for inevitable discovery.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). First, the officers must be participating in an
ongoing investigation separate from the unlawful conduct. Villalba-Alvarado, 345
F.3d at 1019 (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 144). In the instant case it is uncontested that this
2004] 1185
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Miranda v. Arizona36 decision created an exclusionary rule to pro-
tect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during custo-
dial interrogations.3 This rule excluded evidence obtained prior to advising
the suspect of his constitutional rights unless he knowingly and voluntarily
waived those rights.38 Since Miranda, the United States Supreme Court has
carved out three exceptions to this rule.39
In New York v. Quarles,40 the Court created an exception to admit an
unwarned statement and its fruits where the evidence was obtained in an ef-
fort to protect public safety.4 1 The other two exceptions involve the admissi-
bility of derivative evidence even though the initial unwarned statement is
inadmissible.42
The exclusionary rule holds that "evidence seized by the police in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment may not be introduced by the prosecution in a
criminal trial of the victim of the unreasonable search or seizure."4' The
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to both direct and indirect prod-
ucts of government illegality. 44 The initial illegal police conduct is referred to
as the "poisonous tree," and evidence obtained from the illegal conduct is
known as "fruit of the poisonous tree."45 The poisonous fruits doctrine applies
to derivative evidence unless the connection between the initial illegality and
the fruit is too attenuated.46 Although the doctrine was initially developed
first element is satisfied by the search pursuant to a valid warrant. Id. The second
requirement is a showing of reasonable probability that the lawful part of the investi-
gation would have independently led the officers to the same evidence. Id. (citing Nix,
467 U.S. at 444). This evidentiary issue must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 444). The court found that the government failed
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the officers would have independ-
ently discovered the secret panel, but there was a reasonable probability the money in
the coat pocket would have been discovered. Id. at 1020. This portion of the holding
will not be discussed further in this Note.
36. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
37. Id. at 478-79.
38. Id. at 479.
39. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,447-48 (1974).
40. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
41. Id. at 657-58.
42. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448.
43. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.04, at 73 (2d
ed. 1997).
44. Id. § 21.08, at 352.
45. Id.
46. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Passage of time and a
break in the chain of events were two ways in which evidence could become too at-
tenuated to be considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Id.
[Vol. 691186
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under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has also applied it to Fifth
and Sixth Amendment violations.47 Nevertheless, neither the Miranda deci-
sion nor any subsequent Supreme Court decisions have expressly clarified
when physical evidence derived directly from an unwamed statement is ad-
missible.
A. The Miranda Decision
The issue before the Miranda Court was the admissibility of statements
made during custodial interrogations where the defendant was not made
48aware of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Court
directed its opinion at deciding whether procedural safeguards were necessary
to ensure that an individual is informed of his Fifth Amendment rights prior
to custodial interrogation.49 The Court consolidated four cases with similar
facts from different jurisdictions in addressing this issue.5° In every case,
police questioned the defendants in isolation, the defendants were not effec-
tively warned of their rights prior to interrogation, and the interrogation re-
sulted in incriminating statements.5'
Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of confessions was based on a volun-
tariness standard. 2 This standard involved a determination of whether the
defendant's will had been overborne.53 The Miranda Court recognized that
coercion can be psychological as well as physical.54 In light of past problems
of physical coercion and current concerns about psychological coercion, the
Court worried that defendants' confessions may not be a product of their free
will.55 The Court examined law enforcement interrogation manuals and real-
ized that the line between voluntary and involuntary confessions was un-
56
clear. The manuals emphasized the importance of many tactics clearly
47. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 445. The four cases were: California v. Stewart, Miranda v. Arizona,
Vignera v. New York, and Westover v. United States. Id. at 456-57.
51. Id. at 445.
52. The voluntariness standard derives from both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,433 (2000).
53. Id. at 434. Voluntariness inquiries require the court to determine whether the
defendant's confession was a product of his free choice. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 602 (1961). "[I]f he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it
is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired, the.., confession [is inadmissible]." Id.
54. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
55. Id. at 447-48.
56. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49; see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435.
2004] 1187
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aimed at psychologically coercing suspects. 57 The Court also noted that "the
very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty
and trades on the weakness of individuals"58 even without the use of coercive
interrogation.
The Court pointed out that "[t]he current practice of incommunicado in-
terrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished principles-
that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself., 59 The
whole purpose behind these incommunicado interrogation practices was to
put the suspect in such an impaired emotional state as to render him almost
incapable of making a rational decision.6° When these techniques were used,
the suspect was not voluntarily surrendering his constitutional right against
self-incrimination by speaking to the police.61 Rather, the coercive techniques
and the failure to warn the suspect of his right to remain silent led him to
speak. 62 Such statements were not a product of the individual's free will.
63
The Miranda Court determined the best way to restore voluntariness was to
require that the individual be informed of his constitutional rights against
self-incrimination prior to custodial interrogation.
64
Before the police may question a suspect in custody, the suspect must be
made aware of four rights: 1) the right to remain silent, 2) that anything said
can be used against him in court, 3) the right to an attorney at any time prior
to or during questioning, and 4) that an attorney will be appointed if he can-
not afford one.65 Once the warnings have been administered, the individual
may knowingly and voluntarily waive these rights.66 The Miranda Court un-
derscored the importance of their decision by declaring "[t]he requirement of
warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods
of interrogation."67
57. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-50. Examples of such tactics include: getting the
suspect alone and away from home, stripping him of any possible psychological ad-
vantage, and acting as though guilt is a certainty of which they are just confirming the
details. Id.
58. Id. at 455.
59. Id. at 457-58.
60. Id. at 465.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 458.
64. Id. at 467.
65. Id. at 479.
66. Id. Additionally, because the privilege against self-incrimination was so
fundamental to our legal system and the warnings were so easily administered, the
Court rejected the idea of a case by case approach to determine if each individual was
already aware of his constitutional rights before making statements. Id. at 468.
67. Id. at 476. The Court noted that the warnings were not intended to create a
"constitutional straitjacket" impairing efforts of reform. Id. at 467. Rather, the Court
1188 [Vol. 69
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B. Exceptions to Miranda's Exclusionary Rule
The United States Supreme Court stated the first exception to Miranda's
exclusionary rule in New York v. Quarles.68 In Quarles, a woman reported to
Officer Kraft that a man with a gun had raped her.69 She directed the officers
to the grocery store the suspect had just entered. 70 After a brief chase, Kraft
detained Quarles and found him wearing an empty shoulder holster.71 Kraft
asked where the gun was, at which point Quarles pointed and said "the gun is
over there.",72 Immediately after retrieving the gun, Kraft formally arrested
and read him the Miranda warnings. 73 Quarles then made additional incrimi-
nating statements.74
The Court held that Kraft was allowed to ask about the location of the
gun before giving Miranda warnings under a "public safety" exception.75
"[T]he availability of [this] exception does not depend upon the motivation of
the individual officers involved., 76 The Court reasoned that Miranda was
willing to accept fewer convictions as the price for protecting an individual's
Fifth Amendment right.77 But here there was a graver risk to public safety.78
As a result, the Court concluded "public safety outweigh[ed] the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination., 79 The Court ended its opinion by noting that this exception
would not be difficult to apply.80 Police officers could easily differentiate
between questions used to protect the public and questions used to secure
evidence.
8 1
encouraged Congress and the states to develop other ways to more effectively protect
the individual's Fifth Amendment rights while also encouraging efficient law en-
forcement. Id. But until this alternative is developed, these warnings are the constitu-
tional minimum to be followed. Id.
68. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
69. Id. at 651-52.
70. Id.




75. Id. at 655.
76. Id. at 656.
77. Id. at 655-56.
78. Id. at 657.
79. Id.
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The second exception to Miranda's exclusionary rule was announced in
Michigan v. Tucker. 2 Tucker was arrested for rape and received all the
Miranda warnings except that an attorney would be appointed to him if he
could not afford one. 3 Tucker stated that he understood these rights and did
not want an attorney.8 4 Tucker told the police that he was with a man named
Henderson on the night of the crime.85 Henderson told the police a very dif-
ferent story.16 The Court had to decide whether the police violated Tucker's
right against self-incrimination and whether Henderson's testimony had to be
excluded.87
The Tucker Court first recognized that the Miranda rule was impli-
cated.88 The police did not violate Tucker's right against compulsory self-
incrimination, but they did deprive him of the complete set of Miranda's pro-
cedural safeguards established to protect that right.8 9 Although the police had
not violated the Constitution, the Court acknowledged that there had been a
violation of the procedural safeguards of Miranda.90 The real question, then,
was how sweeping the judicial remedy for a nonconstitutional Miranda viola-
tion should be.
9 1
The Court then compared the admissibility of Henderson's testimony to
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment.92 Under Wong Sun v. United
States,93 evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation is not
admissible as a fruit of the poisonous tree.94 The Court found that the Wong
Sun rule did not control here because the police had not violated Tucker's
Fifth Amendment constitutional right but merely the prophylactic standards
announced in Miranda.95 However, the Court agreed that under certain cir-
cumstances the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine could apply to Fifth
Amendment violations.96
82. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Tucker's arrest and questioning took place before the
Miranda decision was handed down, but his trial occurred after the decision. Id. at
435.




87. Id. at 439.
88. Id. at 435.
89. Id. at 444.
90. Id. at 445.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In this case, the police discovered evidence as a result
of an arrest made without probable cause, and the court held that the derivative evi-
dence was inadmissible against defendant at trial. Id.
94. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445.
95. Id. at 445-46.
96. Id. at 446-47.
1190 [Vol. 69
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The final derivative evidence exception to Miranda came from Oregon
v. Elstad.97 Elstad was implicated in a robbery, and the police went to his
house to arrest him.98 When the officers told Elstad they were there to talk
about the robbery, Elstad made incriminating statements in response to the
officers' questions.99 One hour later, at the police station, Elstad received
Miranda warnings.10° He waived those warnings and offered the police a full
confession. 10' The issue before the Court was whether the initial unwarned
statement tainted the later warned confession.
0 2
The Court rejected Elstad's poisonous fruit argument. 10 3 If a violation of
an individual's Fourth Amendment rights results in a confession, that confes-
sion must be suppressed unless the confession is sufficiently attenuated from
the initial illegality.1 4 However, the Court found that in the Fifth Amendment
context, no such attenuation is needed to admit the second statement.105 The
Court noted that Miranda's exclusionary rule was broader than the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule. 0 6 After all, Miranda's exclusionary rule can
be triggered even without a Fifth Amendment violation.
0 7
The Court relied on its language from Quarles and Tucker to reiterate
that failure to give the Miranda warnings was not a constitutional violation.1'0
Where there was no deliberately coercive police conduct, giving an individual
a full set of Miranda warnings cured the presumed compulsion of an earlier
unwarned statement.1 9 The Court held that an individual who provides a
voluntary but unwarned statement is not precluded from subsequently waiv-
ing his rights and giving another statement once he received the Miranda
warnings. 10
97. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 301.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 300.
103. Id. at 305-07.
104. Id. at 306. In a situation where a Fourth Amendment violation tainted the
confession, the prosecution must show both voluntariness and a sufficient attenuation
in events in order to admit the confession. Id.
105. Id. at 318.
106. Id. at 306.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 314.
110. Id. at 318.
2004]
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C. Dickerson: Miranda as a Constitutional Rule
In Dickerson v. United States"' the Supreme Court considered whether
the Constitution itself required that an individual receive Miranda warn-
ings. 112 The issue arose as a result of a federal statute purporting to require
that the admissibility of confessions be governed only by a voluntariness
test. 113 Miranda warnings were to be no more than a factor of the test.1 14 The
Court held that the federal statute was unconstitutional.115
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that it had supervisory
authority over federal courts." 6 Congress could control judicially enacted
rules and procedures not mandated by the Constitution, but Congress did not
have authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision based on the Constitu-
tion. 17
Next, the language itself in Miranda indicated that the Court intended to
set forth a constitutional rule. 1 8 The Miranda opinion stated that its purpose
was "'to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies
and courts to follow." ' 119 Miranda further noted that the confessions in each
of the four cases "'were obtained from the defendant under circumstances
that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege."",1
2 0
The Miranda Court invited Congress to protect the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, but warned that anything proposed must be
"'at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and
in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.""
121
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that Miranda's exceptions
prove that Miranda is not a constitutional rule.' 22 The Court insisted that
these exceptions simply illuminate the fact that constitutional rules are not
111. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
112. Id. at 432.
113. Id. at 435-36 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000)).
114. Id. See also,28 U.S.C. § 3501. Because of the direct conflict between this
statute and the Miranda holding, it was clear that Congress intended to overrule
Miranda. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 436. Congress would only have the power to over-
rule Miranda if it was not a constitutional decision. Id. at 436-37.
115. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442-43.
116. Id. at 437.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 439.
119. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966)).
120. Id. at 439-40 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491).
121. Id. at 440 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
122. Id. at 441; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
1192 [Vol. 69
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immutable. 23 The majority concluded that Miranda produced a constitutional
rule that Congress is not able to supercede by statute.
1 24
D. The Post-Dickerson Circuit Split
The circuit courts have split in their interpretation of Dickerson. In
United States v. DeSumma,125 for example, an officer asked DeSumma if he
had any weapons before giving him his Miranda warnings. 126 DeSumma di-
rected the officers to a gun in his vehicle. 27 The Third Circuit analyzed its
pre-Dickerson decisions and decided that they were in line with Dickerson's
holding.' 28 The court interpreted Dickerson to draw a distinction between the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment with respect to derivative evidence.' 29 The
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine only applied to Fourth Amendment viola-
tions.
30
Citing Elstad, the Third Circuit found that "the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule is 'to deter unreasonable searches, no matter
how probative their fruits"' 13' and that "'the Miranda presumption ... does
not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently
tainted."",132 The court reasoned that applying the poisonous fruits doctrine to
evidence derived from Miranda violations would be inconsistent with the
doctrine's goals of deterring police misconduct and assuring trustworthy evi-
dence.'
33
The court rejected DeSumma's argument that these pre-Dickerson cases
were inapplicable because they read Miranda as a prophylactic rule.
1 34
Rather, the court pointed to the language in Dickerson which stated that there
was a difference between an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amend-
ment and a statement obtained without Miranda warnings under the Fifth
123. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. In particular, the Court pointed out that its re-
fusal in Elstad to apply the fruits doctrine was a product of the inherent difference in
an unreasonable search and a confession obtained without Miranda warnings, not that
Miranda is not a constitutional rule. Id.
124. Id. at 444.
125. 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001).
126. Id. at 178.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 179-80.
129. Id. at 180.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 179 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)).
132. Id. (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307) (alteration in original).
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Amendment.'11 The Third Circuit interpreted this language to mean that the
Supreme Court anticipated and rejected DeSumma's argument. 36
In United States. v. Sterling,1 7 on facts similar to DeSumma, the Fourth
Circuit held that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine did not apply to
physical evidence derived from a Miranda violation.138 The court looked to
its pre-Dickerson cases for guidance, 39 noting that the Supreme Court held
witness testimony admissible in Tucker 40 and a subsequent, warned state-
ment admissible in Elstad.'4 ' Consequently, as long as the unwarned state-
ment that led to the physical evidence was voluntary, the physical evidence is
admissible. 
42
The Sterling court pointed to the wording of Miranda's holding, that
certain warnings must be given before custodial interrogation for the individ-
ual's statements to be admissible. 143 The court interpreted the Dickerson
holding to indicate that the exceptions to Miranda were not overruled by
Dickerson.144 As a result, there was still a distinction between the admissibil-
ity of statements and derivative evidence.
45
Unlike the Third and Fourth Circuits, the First Circuit did not believe
that the poisonous fruits doctrine never applied to evidence derived from
Miranda violations. 146 In United States v. Faulkingham,'47 the First Circuit
considered whether the fruits doctrine applied to physical evidence obtained
as a result of an unwarned statement. 148 In that case, Faulkingham made in-
criminating statements after his arrest but prior to receiving
Miranda warnings that led the officers to physical evidence.' 49 The court
determined that the admissibility of physical evidence should be analyzed
under the "'twin rationales' for Miranda: trustworthiness and deterrence."' 50
135. Id. (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000)).
136. Id.
137. 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002).
138. Id. at 218-19.
139. Id. In United States v. Elie, the court relied on the Supreme Court's rulings in
Tucker and Elstad to find the fruits doctrine inapplicable to derivative physical evi-
dence. Id. (citing United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1142 (4th Cir. 1997), abro-
gated by United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002)).
140. Sterling, 283 F.3d at 218. See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
141. Sterling, 283 F.3d at 218. See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.




146. United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002).
147. 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002).
148. Id. at 90.
149. Id. at 86.
150. Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985)).
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The First Circuit recognized that Elstad permitted the admissibility of
the second confession on the basis of voluntariness.15 ' But the court found
that Elstad did not completely prohibit admissibility of evidence derived from
a Miranda violation.15 2 Where there was more than a merely technical
Miranda violation and where a "substantial nexus" exists between the viola-
tion and the derivative evidence, the evidence could plausibly be sup-
pressed.1
5 3
The court held that in some situations the fruits doctrine should apply to
Miranda violations but in others it should not. 5 4 To determine when the
fruits doctrine applies, a court must balance the reliability of the derivative
evidence against the need to deter police misconduct. 55 In this case, the de-
rivative evidence was reliable, Faulkingham's statements were voluntary, and
the failure to give Miranda warnings was negligent but not willful. 56 There-
fore, the evidence in Faulkingham was admissible. 157 But, the First Circuit
left open the possibility of applying the fruits doctrine in a situation where
deterrence concerns were greater and the Miranda violation deliberate.15 8
In United States v. Patane59 the Tenth Circuit held that the poisonous
fruits doctrine applied to physical evidence derived from a Miranda viola-
tion. 16 Patane responded to police questioning but did not receive a complete
Miranda warning.' 6' As a result of Patane's statements, the police discovered
a gun.162 The court analyzed both Supreme Court precedent and the decisions
of the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits 63 in formulating its decision.' 64
The court rejected the Government's reliance on Tucker and Elstad for
the proposition that the poisonous fruits doctrine never applied in Fifth





155. Id. at 93.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 93-94.
158. Id. at 94.
159. 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
160. Id. at 1029.
161. Id. at 1015.
162. Id.
163. See United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002); United States
v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.2d 176
(3d Cir. 2001).
164. SeePatane, 304 F.3d at 1018-29.
165. Id. at 1019.
166. "'The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are "not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution . . . ."' Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)
(quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)) (citations omitted).
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the premise that Miranda was a prophylactic rather than constitutional rule. 68
This premise was completely undermined in Dickerson when the Supreme
Court said Miranda was a constitutional rule. 1
69
The court rejected the holdings of the Third and Fourth Circuits that
physical evidence derived from a Miranda violation could never be sup-
pressed under the fruits doctrine. 170 Rather, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the
two major premises of the First Circuit's Faulkingham decision: that
Dickerson changed the analysis of applying the fruits doctrine to Miranda
violations, and that those fruits must be suppressed to adhere to the goal of
deterrence.' 7' However, the court declined to adopt the First Circuit's position
that suppression is only necessary where there is deliberate police miscon-
duct. 172 Instead, the Tenth Circuit held that the fruits doctrine applied regard-
less of whether the Miranda violations were willful or negligent.'
73
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In United States v. Villalba-Alvarado,174 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit determined physical evidence derived from a Miranda viola-
tion should be admitted even in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Dickerson.175 Ultimately the court held that all evidence derived from a
Miranda violation must be scrutinized under a voluntariness standard to de-
termine its admissibility.
176
The court first looked to its pre-Dickerson cases to see if any distinction
had previously been made regarding derivative physical evidence. 177 In
United States v. Carter,178 the Eighth Circuit held physical evidence derived
from an unwarned statement inadmissible. 7 9 But that holding was based on
the fact that the defendant's subsequent consent was not voluntary.'8 0 In
167. "Since there was no actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights,
[Tucker] was not controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a
constitutional violation must be suppressed." Id. at 308 (citing Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433,445-46 (1974)).
168. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1019.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1023.
171. Id. at 1027.
172. Id. at 1027-29.
173. Id.
174. 345 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2003).
175. Id. at 1019.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1014.
178. 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989).
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United States v. Wiley,'' the Eighth Circuit relied on Elstad to determine that
physical evidence obtained from an unwamed but voluntary statement was
admissible because consent was voluntarily granted after the Miranda viola-
tion. 8 2 The court conceded that Wiley does not control the present case be-
cause it dealt with physical fruits flowing indirectly, not directly, from a
Miranda violation, but the court did find Wiley instructive.183 Thus the court
found that, before Dickerson, the Eighth Circuit did not interpret Elstad to
apply only to subsequent warned statements, but to other forms of derivative
evidence as well.1
84
The court then turned to the purpose underlying the Miranda rule to de-
termine whether the fruits doctrine should apply differently to different types
of derivative evidence.185 After acknowledging that the two main purposes
underlying Miranda are deterrence of police misconduct and trustworthiness
of evidence, the court rejected the idea that deterrence serves a different role
for physical evidence than it does for testimonial evidence. 186 Additionally, it
concluded that the trustworthiness rationale did not exist at all for derivative
physical evidence because the reliability of physical evidence is not dimin-
ished by an unwarned statement.18 7
The court then turned to the decisions of other circuits on this issue.
88
In factually similar cases, the Third and Fourth Circuits' 89 held that even after
Dickerson, Elstad continued to govern the admissibility of subsequent state-
ments and physical evidence.' 90 The Eighth Circuit found this to coincide
with its pre-Dickerson belief that Elstad applied to all forms of derivative
evidence.' 9' The First Circuit 192 resolved this issue by balancing the deter-
rence and trustworthiness factors on a case-by-case basis. 93 Under this test,
the deterrence factor required deliberate action by an officer to suppress the
derivate evidence; mere negligent conduct is insufficient. 94 The Eighth Cir-
cuit rejected that test because it could not find precedent supporting a test that
relied on an officer's subjective intent. 195
181. 997 F.2d 378 (8th Cir. 1993), abrogated by United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d
819 (8th Cir. 1994).
182. Id. at 383.
183. United States v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007, 1014 (8th Cir. 2003).
184. Id. at 1014-15.
185. Id. at 1015.
186. Id. at 1015-16.
187. Id. at 1016.
188. Id. at 1016-19.
189. See supra notes 125-45 and accompanying text.
190. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1016-17.
191. Id. at 1016.
192. See supra notes 146-58 and accompanying text.
193. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1017.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1018.
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Finally, the Eighth Circuit noted the Tenth Circuit's conclusion 196 that
Elstad and Tucker were undermined, if not overruled, by Dickerson's holding
that Miranda was a constitutional rule. 197 As a result, the Tenth Circuit chose
to extend the fruits doctrine to derivative physical evidence whether it flowed
from deliberate or negligent police misconduct.198 The Eighth Circuit rejected
the Patane court's holding for two reasons. 199 First, the Eighth Circuit did not
believe that Elstad's holding relied on the volitional character of subsequent
statements. 20 Therefore, Elstad should apply to other types of derivative
evidence as well. 20' Additionally, this court parted with the Tenth Circuit by





The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals combined Supreme Court prece-
dent, its own precedent, and the decisions of other circuits in deciding that
derivative physical evidence should be treated the same as derivative testimo-
nial evidence. 20 3 The Eighth Circuit joined the Third and Fourth Circuits,
concluding that a voluntariness standard should be applied to determine the
admissibility of all types of evidence derived from a Miranda violation.
204
V. COMMENT
Despite Dickerson, the Eighth Circuit examined its reasoning in pre-
Dickerson cases and found that reasoning still valid.205 However, in reaching
this decision the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted Dickerson's effect on Elstad.
The court erred in holding that all types of derivative evidence should be
governed by a voluntariness standard.20 6
The Eighth Circuit's starting point for analysis of the issue of admissi-
bility of physical fruits focused on the potential admissibility of subsequent
warned statements and witness testimony.207 The court noted that in its pre-
196. See supra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
197. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1017-18 (citing United States v. Patane, 304
F.3d 1013, 1024-25 (2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004)).
198. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1027-29.
199. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d at 1018.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1019.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 1014-15 (discussing United States v. Wiley, 997 F.2d 378 (8th Cir.
1993), abrogated by United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989)).
206. See id. at 1019.
207. Id. at 1014.
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Dickerson cases it interpreted Elstad as a broad exception applying to several
forms of derivative evidence.
20 8
The court found "it necessary to accord greater deference to Dickerson's
preservation of the ongoing distinction in application of the exclusionary rule
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments than did the Tenth Circuit in
Patane."2°9 The Dickerson Court opined that its refusal in Elstad to apply the
"traditional" fruits doctrine to Miranda violations did not convey the message
that Miranda is not a constitutional rule.210 The Court noted a difference be-
tween unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment and unwarned
statements under the Fifth Amendment. 211 Dickerson's analysis about the
difference stops there. No other court has clarified the difference between a
Fourth and Fifth Amendment violation.
In reality, the difference between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is a
difference in limitations on when to apply the fruits doctrine, not the applica-
tion itself.212 The Fourth Amendment is adamantly protected because society
holds privacy in the home as very important. 213 Once the police have violated
a person's Fourth Amendment rights, the person's privacy cannot be given
back.214 Therefore, evidence derived from a Fourth Amendment violation is
only admissible if there is a break in time and events such that the taint of the
initial violation has dissipated. 215 However, when a person's Fifth Amend-
ment rights are violated, less is required to cure the taint.216 As the Elstad
Court noted, "a careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings
serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissi-
ble." 2 1
7
Fifth Amendment violations are easier to cure than Fourth Amendment
violations. But the fruits doctrine holds that a constitutional violation requires
suppression of evidence derived from the violation until the violation is suffi-
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1018-19.
210. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
211. Id.
212. Kirsten Lela Ambach, Comment, Miranda's Poisoned Fruit Tree: The Ad-
missibility of Physical Evidence Derived from an Unwarned Statement, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 757, 785 (2003).
213. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) ("'The right of the
people to be secure in their... houses ... shall not be violated."' The strength of this
language shows "'[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion."') (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
214. Ambach, supra note 212, at 784.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 784-85.
217. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1985).
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ciently dissipated."' The Eighth Circuit's reliance on Elstad's refusal to ap-
ply the "traditional" fruits doctrine does not prohibit some application of the
fruits doctrine in the Miranda context.21 9 The "traditional" fruits doctrine
explained in Wong Sun centers around the concept of attenuation.220 When
the derivative fruit is physical evidence gained immediately from an un-
warned statement, no opportunity exists to cure the Miranda violation or dis-
sipate the taint of the physical evidence. 22' Thus, the real "difference" be-
tween an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and an unwarned
statement under the Fifth Amendment is the "limits of the fruits doctrine, not
its application., 222 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit erred in refusing to apply
the fruits doctrine to derivative physical evidence.
The Eighth Circuit also looked to the "twin rationales" of Miranda in
reaching its decision.223 It noted that suppressing the original unwarned
statement deters overzealous law enforcement.224 The threat of suppression
removes the incentive for police officers to obtain coerced statements.
225
However, the court failed to address any detrimental effects caused by admit-
ting the derivative physical evidence. Instead, the court said it could not "dis-
cern that the deterrence rationale serves a role that is greater or lesser than the
role it serves in the context of derivative statements. 2 26 It relied on Elstad's
finding that excluding a subsequent voluntary statement made after the warn-
ing was given would not further Miranda's deterrence rationale.227 But, nei-
ther Elstad nor Tucker involved physical evidence. Therefore, the rationale
for admitting derivative testimonial evidence cannot simply be transposed to
physical evidence. The physical evidence in the instant case was derived from
a constitutional violation. The taint had not been sufficiently dissipated, so
the Eighth Circuit erred in not applying the fruits doctrine.2 28
The Eighth Circuit also rested its decision on the belief that Elstad's
holding did not rely on the fact that the subsequent warned statements were
voluntarily given.229 Regardless of whether the turning point in Elstad deci-
sion was the volitional nature of the statements, the court still missed a fun-
damental point. The post-Dickerson cases holding that the fruits doctrine does
218. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
219. Ambach, supra note 212, at 785.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 785-86.
222. Id. at 785.
223. United States v. Vilialba-Alvarado, 345 F.3d 1007, 1015 (8th Cir. 2003).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1016.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 1018.
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not apply to derivative physical evidence all rely on Elstad and Tucker.23 °
Both Elstad and Tucker are clearly based on the belief that Miranda was pro-
phylactic, not constitutional.231 Since the Supreme Court decided Dickerson,
many courts have grasped at dicta in Elstad, Tucker, and Dickerson in efforts
to determine whether the fruits doctrine applies to physical evidence.
Shortly after the Eighth Circuit issued its ruling in Villalba-Alvarado v.
United States, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Patane2" On June 28, 2004 the
Court issued a plurality opinion that failed to resolve the circuit split and left
us with no clearer an understanding of whether the poisonous fruit doctrine
233
should apply to physical fruits derived from a Miranda violation.
The plurality concluded that the goal of Miranda was to protect suspects
234against self-incrimination. Because the introduction of physical evidence
does not implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Court reasoned, the
physical fruits derived from a Miranda violation need not be suppressed.
235
Further, the plurality said the police violate neither the Constitution nor the
Miranda rule when they fail to administer the Miranda warnings.
236
Concurring in the decision, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor found "it
unnecessary to decide whether the detective's failure to give Patane the full
Miranda warnings should be characterized as a violation of the Miranda rule
itself, or whether there is '[any]thing to deter' so long as the unwarned state-
ments are not later introduced at trial. 237 Writing for the dissent, Justice
Souter argued that the plurality and concurring opinions would give law en-
230. See generally id.; United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002);
United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001).
231. "'The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are "not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution . . . ."' Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)
(quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)) (citations omitted). "Since
there was no actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights, [Tucker] was
not controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional
violation must be suppressed." Id. at 308 (emphasis added). The Tucker Court distin-
guished Wong Sun because "the police conduct at issue here did not abridge respon-
dent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to
safeguard that privilege." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
232. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
233. See id.
234. Id. at 2624.
235. Id. The Court reasoned that the protection offered by the Self-Incrimination
Clause acts to prohibit a criminal defendant from being compelled to testify against
himself. Id. at 2626. Because the primary protection of the Clause is testimonial, it
"cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence." Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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forcement an incentive to disregard the Miranda warnings.238 Justice Breyer
filed a separate dissent in which he opined that physical fruits derived from
an unwarned statement would be suppressed "unless the failure to [give the]
Miranda warnings was in good faith.
' 239
The Tenth Circuit correctly articulated the current state of the law in
holding, "Wong Sun requires suppression only of the fruits of unconstitu-
tional conduct, [therefore] the violation of a prophylactic rule did not require
the same remedy., 240 Therefore, Dickerson's declaration of Miranda as a
constitutional rule also requires some application of the fruits doctrine to de-
rivative physical evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The circuit courts are split on the issue of whether physical evidence de-
rived from a Miranda violation is subject to the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. In Villalba-Alvarado v. United States,241 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that the fruits doctrine did not apply to derivative physical
evidence. It relied on language in Dickerson that there is a difference between
the application of the fruits doctrine in the Fourth Amendment context and
application in the Fifth Amendment context. 242 However, the Supreme Court
has not fully fleshed out what exactly it meant when it made these statements
in Dickerson. What we do know is that the exclusionary rule requires that
evidence derived from a constitutional violation be excluded.243 The
Dickerson Court announced that Miranda was a constitutional rule. There-
fore, the Eighth Circuit clearly erred in concluding that the exclusionary rule
did not apply to the violation of Villalba-Alvarado's constitutional rights.
KERRY F. SCHONWALD
238. Id. at 2631 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated "[t]hat inducement to
forestall involuntary statements and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we
turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an unwamed statement leads
investigators to tangible evidence." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 2632 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S.
Ct. 2620 (2004).
241. 345 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2003).
242. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,441 (2000).
243. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
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